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Abstract It has become a standard for researchers car-
rying out biotechnology projects to do a life cycle assess-
ment (LCA). This is a process for assessing the environ-
mental impact of a technology, product or policy. Doing
so is no simplematter, and in the last decades, a rich set of
methodologies has developed around LCA. However,
the proper methods and meanings of the process remain
contested. Preceding the development of the international
standard that now governs LCA, there was a lively debate
in the academic community about the inclusion of
‘values’ within the process. We revisit this debate and
reconsider the way forward for LCA. We set out ways in
which those outside of science can provide input into
LCAs by informing the value assumptions at stake. At
the same time, we will emphasize that the role of those
within the scientific community need not (and some-
times, will inevitably not) involve value-free inquiry.
We carry out this exploration through a case study of a
particular technology project that sought ways to produce
industrial and consumer products from algal oils.
Keywords Life cycle assessment . Responsible
innovation . Technology assessment . Sustainability
Introduction
It has become standard for researchers carrying out
biotechnology projects to do a life cycle assessment
(LCA). This is a process for assessing the environ-
mental impact of a technology, product or policy.
Doing so is no simple matter, and in the last de-
cades, a rich set of methodologies has developed
around LCA. Reflecting this complexity, the tech-
nique has its own dedicated journal (the Journal of
Life Cycle Assessment); there are several commer-
cially run, well-marketed databases of the impacts of
different substances; and in 2009 Time magazine
named life cycle assessment one of the ‘10 Ideas
Changing the World Right Now’. However, the
proper methods and meanings of the process remain
contested. One practitioner argues that LCA as an
international standard is failing because competing
interpretations of it are so widespread [1]. Preceding
the development of the international standard that
now governs LCA, there was a lively debate in the
academic community about the inclusion of ‘values’
within the process. We revisit this debate and recon-
sider the way forward for LCA. It is a goal of this
paper to set out ways in which those outside of
science can provide input into LCAs by informing
the value assumptions at stake. We conclude by
suggesting that the role of those within the scientific
community need not (and sometimes, will inevitably
not) involve value-free inquiry and proposing that
researchers embrace this state of affairs.
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We carry out this exploration through a case study
of a particular technology project and use it in order
to illustrate broader points about the way that tech-
nology is assessed. The project is an EU FP7 project
called BISIGODOS. It ran from 2013 to 2017. It
investigated ways in which to use algal oils to make
consumer and industrial products such as inks, cos-
metics and foodstuffs. Such products are currently
manufactured with a petrochemical feedstock. There
are numerous other ongoing efforts to identify how to
make useful products with algal oils (such as the
MIRACLES project), and indeed the use of biofuels
is the most commercially developed such effort. In
the BISIGODOS project, the algae were grown using
carbon dioxide that resulted directly from the indus-
trial emissions of a cement factory. Algae might
similarly be produced using carbon dioxide emis-
sions from other industrial processes such as steel
factories or thermal power plants. One might expect
such an arrangement to count favourably for the
products from the point of view of sustainability,
both because this source of carbon dioxide is cheap
and readily available and because the manufacture of
the final set of products will have an element of
carbon offsetting built into it.
The Aspiration of Neutrality
Life cycle assessment is sometimes described
amongst the ‘tools’ that those seeking to carry out
responsible research and innovation (RRI) might ap-
ply [2]. While RRI has been keen to include LCA
within its remit, LCA practitioners themselves—
guided in part by the international standards that
govern the process—are sometimes coy about the
idea that LCA involves making judgements of value.
This contrasts with the emphasis of RRI upon en-
couraging and facilitating reflection upon the ethical
and social aspects of a technology from its inception.
Our focus in this paper is on this coyness in the LCA
world concerning the way that value judgements find
their way into life cycle assessments.
There is a certain attraction to the ideal of having a
tool that objectively assesses the impact of products,
technologies or policies. Economic decisions run
through the process of technology development and
deployment. We need to decide where research efforts
will be directed and, especially, which research projects
will be funded. We need to decide what policies will
apply to those in a position to produce a product: what
regulatory and fiscal regime will apply? Individually,
we also make consumption decisions, and these may be
influenced by the standing of the product with regard to
sustainability goals. Companies, too, will wish to un-
derstand the overall impact of the products and process-
es that they create in order to align them with their own
sustainability goals. Such economic decisions are not
themselves technical and carry with them a dose of
politics. Would not it be valuable both for the purposes
of making better decisions, and for making decision
processes transparent, to have a tool that can assess a
product or a process without making implicit or explicit
controversial claims about—for example—what overall
direction a research area ought to take, or how risk for
future generations should be applied, or what the expec-
tations should be upon individuals to effect or accept
changes in their economic status? It would thus be
highly useful to have an objective measure that guides
decision-making.
Put more concisely, the thought is this: discussions
about resource allocation are often fraught, political or
ideological; assessments of the relevant facts are highly
complicated and thereby liable to have their conclusions
influenced by the independently held views of those
carrying them out; it is therefore useful in the extreme
to have a process that can identify the relevant inputs,
compare them and provide an assessment of the outputs.
LCA is or should be such a process.
Where Values Relate to the LCA Process
The above-described objectivity is an aspiration for
LCA that is sometimes put forward baldly and, even
where it is not, describes something of the attraction of
the tool. Nonetheless, such an aspiration is not universal,
and a sizeable part of those developing and using the
standard see it as a method for making transparent the
reasoning process about how best to judge the impact of
a technology or policy, rather than as a way of
outsourcing or avoiding judgement. Consequently, the
sophistication of LCA methods is partly a reflection of
the explicit or implicit recognition that doing an LCA
involves making judgements of value. That is, making
judgements of what is more or less important, of what
should be done, of how benefits or harms or risks should
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be distributed, or of how all those matters should be
governed.1
There are two areas of decision for those designing
an LCA that will touch upon issues of value. The first
area is concerned with the impacts of a technology. How
are these compared, and how are they selected? The
second area is concerned with the description of the
technology itself. How should we understand the extent
and proper delineation of the system that is under
assessment?
Impact Category Selection
Each of those areas can again be subdivided.2 Impacts
can be divided into different impact categories. The ISO
standard on LCA sets out eighteen categories of impact.
The ReCiPe 2016 method sets out eighteen midpoint
and three endpoint impact categories. In this method,
endpoints are broad areas such as damage to ecosystems
and damage to human health, whereas midpoints are
pathways to those damages such as global warming/
climate change, ionizing radiation and particulate mat-
ter. Consider the issue of which of those eighteen im-
pacts to compare. The BISIGODOS assessment exam-





– Photochemical oxidant formation
Why would an LCA ignore any of these eighteen?
The answer is that a category may be inapplicable to the
technology, or that an assessment of a category may be
excessively complex, given the goals of the overall
assessment. Consider the category of light pollution. It
is obscure how it might be useful to assess algal oil-
based shampoos for their impact upon light pollution.
The impacts are prima facie both minuscule and hard to
predict, and the margin of error would make any data
questionable.
The selection criteria for which impacts are to be
selected might be put in starker terms:
The selection of impact categories depends on the
purpose of the LCA, e.g. what kind of decision is
going to be taken based on the LCA… Basically,
selection of impact categories is a matter between
the commissioner and the practitioner…([4], p.
31)
Insinuated, if not logically implied, in such wording is
the notion that the purpose of the LCA follows from
what the LCA commissioner chooses to aim at, with
some input from the practitioner about what is feasible,
and that the proper selection criteria follow largely from
the commissioner’s purpose. Such a view gives a wider
latitude than is now fashionable to the discretion of
those commissioning LCA. Is it possible for an LCA,
given its context, to be assigned the wrong goals? Can
an assessment’s goal selection be criticized by others? In
the design process as described by the ISO, the question
of the goal of the LCA is repeatedly returned to. Those
answering at each stage the question of what the goals
are must be appealing to some criteria for their decision
that go beyond their personal preferences or profession-
al interests. If the question is to be answered with
external criteria, then it must be possible to give the
wrong answer.
This can be taken a step further by looking at the
method by which the impact category is calculated.
These impact assessment methodologies vary not only
in the manner of the calculation but also in the output of
the category itself. Common methodologies include
CML 2001 [5], EF/ILCD [6] and Impact 2002+ [7]. A
newmethod, ReCiPe [8], proposed in 2008 and updated
in 2016, was initially an amalgamation of CML and
another common approach, Eco-Indicator 99 [9]. The
choice of methodology was noted as being important by
Dreyer et al. [10], where the results for an LCA were
largely similar in energy-related impact categories but
considerably different in toxicity-related categories.
Choice of impact assessment methodology must there-
fore also be agreed by the commissioner and practitioner
as part of the scope, as the methodology must be accu-
rate for the impact categories that have been chosen to
1 Note that assessments can be aimed at different kinds of object. The
goal may be to assess the impact of a product, such as biofuels. Or it
may be to assess the impact of a policy, such as a subsidy for biofuels.
The standards guiding LCA demand that the goal of the assessment is
explored at the outset and is continuously returned to throughout the
assessment. After goals are specified, the inputs of the process under
assessment are inventoried, an analysis of the impact is made of each of
these inputs, and these impacts are combined in order to provide an
overall assessment. From herein we will, for the sake of brevity, talk of
LCA as an assessment of a technology.
2 Here we draw and build upon the classification of value judgements
in LCA put forward in Wender et al. [3].
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be desirable. It therefore stands to reason that it is
possible to not only give the wrong answer on one’s
own terms but also to give the wrong answer calculated
by the wrong methodology.
It is clear from the ISO 14040 (2006) that impact
category selection depends upon being able link the
environmental effect to the cause, with some degree of
certainty. The standard puts the process in the following
terms:
§ 4.4.2.2.2 — Environmental relevance encom-
passes a qualitative assessment of the degree of
linkage between category indicator result and cat-
egory endpoints; for example high, moderate or
low linkage.3
The criteria for selecting indicators are concerned with
the ability to connect the indicator to an impact. Where
the effect of a category is reversible, brief, localized and
small, it is unlikely to be included in the impact
assessment.
Interestingly, the BISIGODOS project does not in-
clude an assessment upon the category of primary re-
source depletion. Depending on the baseline, its effects
on this category would certainly be positive in compar-
ison with the alternative industrial products that are
available on the market today. The environmental bur-
den of the carbon dioxide feedstock lies with the prima-
ry production process of the cement as it is a secondary
(waste) product. The algae feed and the accompanying
conversion technology would have some depleting
effect in many cases. Still, if products that are currently
made using petrochemical feedstocks are made instead
using a renewable source, then one would expect that
the primary resource of oil is depleted far less than it
otherwise would be. This is a point at which an LCA
touches upon a deeper issue of contention about global
politics and the direction of technology. The inclusion of
stores of oil as a primary resource is itself not uncontro-
versial as a category for measuring the impact of a
technology, given that a sizeable group argues that such
resources are better left untouched both for sustainabil-
ity and global political reasons [11]. In this sense, the
BISIGODOS assessment claimed less for itself than it
might have done and in doing so applied a more ambi-
tious environmental standard.
Aside from that particular policy issue, the appeal to
uncertainty raises another normative issue. This is the
extent to which claims that fall under the rubric of
‘scientific’ ought to be carried with certainty. For
example:
Scientists have less confidence…in the relation-
ship between climate forcing and physical damage
than they have in the relationship between climate
forcing and greenhouse gas emissions. The choice
between those two indicators [i.e., environmental
damage indicators and greenhouse gas emissions]
is therefore a tradeoff between scientific reliability
and the ability of the indicator to reflect our con-
cerns [12].
We might draw a connection to the precautionary prin-
ciple in science and technology policy, which demands
limits on actions that have more uncertain conse-
quences.4 Insofar as the precautionary principles ap-
plies, it may demand the inclusion of outcomes about
which there is less confidence of knowledge into an
LCA, since that principle demands greater responsive-
ness to uncertainty.
Weighting
An area that is more difficult to resolve, and that brings us
more immediately to the heart of the issue of the purpose
of LCAs, is that of whether, and if so how, to compare the
different impacts once they have been assessed. In the
3 The standard continues:
§ 4.4.2.2.4—The environmental relevance of the category indicator
or characterization model should be clearly stated in the following
terms:
a) The ability of the category indicator to reflect the conse-
quences of the LCI results on the category endpoint(s), at
least qualitatively
b) The addition of environmental data or information to the
characterization model with respect to the category end-
point(s), including
– The condition of the category endpoint(s)
– The relative magnitude of the assessed change in the cate-
gory endpoints
– The spatial aspects, such as area and scale
– The temporal aspects, such as duration, residence time,
persistence and timing
– The reversibility of the environmental mechanism
– The uncertainty of the linkages between the category indi-
cators and the category endpoints
4 For doubts about the precautionary principle, see Read and
O’Riordan [13], but c.f. John [14].
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history of its development, the idea of ‘weighting’ differ-
ent kinds of environmental impact has been controver-
sial.5 Can it be meaningful to take the disparate impacts
of a product upon, for example, eutrophication (measured
by excess macronutrients in water leading to algae
growth), ozone depletion and ‘climate change’ (measured
by carbon dioxide production), and to assign one single
number to them? If the product is re-engineered so that it
leads to more carbon dioxide production but less eutro-
phication, what effect should that have upon the prod-
uct’s singular weighted ‘impact’? It would seem that the
answer is indeterminate, or is supervenient upon other
assessments of, for example, the extent to which biodi-
versity is an independent value, or the extent to which we
should be concerned about toxicity to immediate popu-
lations, in comparison with long-term climate change
effects to future generations.
In discussions of the demerits of weighting, one is
particularly likely to come across assertions of the im-
portance of the objectivity of LCAs. The international
standard itself contains such an assertion, in stating that
procedures involving weighting of different environ-
mental effects are ‘based on value choices and not
scientifically based’ and thereby are not be used in
LCAs aimed at public consumption.6 The assessment
in BISIGODOS, accordingly, does not make any at-
tempt at weighting the different impact categories that
it sets out; it sets out the five selected categories and
analyses each separately.
We will return to such arguments below. For the
moment, note that weighting of outputs may include
judgements about:
– Time discounting. Should harms or benefits to
members of future generations count for less than
harms or benefits to members of current genera-
tions? We tend to discount costs and benefits for
ourselves that are far off in the future and might
similarly do so for future generations. If so, then our
weighting might place somewhat less weight on
impacts that will occur in the future, such as climate
change, in comparison with immediate impacts,
such as eutrophication or light pollution. Others,
however, argue that time discounting carries unac-
ceptable implications.7
– Effects on different communities. Where an impact
is likely to land more heavily upon those who are
less well off, it might be argued that the marginal
disutility of that impact will be greater and so should
be weighted higher. Alternatively, it may be held that
it is not the role of technologists to correct for social
injustice in a direct way and that accordingly their
assessments should assume equality of impact across
communities for any given output.
– The relative disvalue of risk to life and economic
costs. A full assessment would need to make com-
parisons of risks to life and economic costs. Policy-
makers are used to making such comparisons, but
the background methodology is by no means un-
controversial [17].
System Boundary Definition and Functional Unit
Selection
There are two more subtle ways in which judgements of
value enter the LCA process, running not through the
way in which the outputs of an assessment are under-
stood but instead based in how the object of assessment
is defined at the outset. LCAs carry judgements not just
about weighting but also judgements relating to individ-
ual behaviour and government policy. For any given
product, what assumptions are to be made about how
much people will seek to consume, how they will dis-
pose of it, the commercial effects on other industries of
introducing the product, the potential beneficial envi-
ronmental effects on the production of other products
and how far these will be exploited. What should we
expect of behaviour change? How many T-shirts a year
do you assume people buy and dispose of? How do
people dispose of their clothes? What are the commer-
cial effects on other industries of producing T-shirts in
one way rather than another? What are the potential
beneficial environmental effects on the production of
other products of producing T-shirts in one way rather
than another? In order to give an account of the impact
of a product on the environment, one requires an ac-
count of the relevant alternatives at stake: of how to
5 Similar issues are faced by the ‘normalization’ of outputs, which
faces the issue of how to choose normalization references. See Laurent
et al. [15].
6 ISO 14044 (2006), sn. 4.4.3.4 and 4.4.5
7 There is a good discussion of time discounting as it relates to climate
change indicators in Hertwich et al. [12]. For arguments against pure
social discount rates, see Caney ([16], pp. 320–342).
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describe the world with, and without, the product. The
relevant worlds to compare can be variously described;
there is not obviously a natural fact-of-the-matter about
which is the closest possible worlds.
A key question is whether one includes changes in
human—and especially, economic—behaviour that the
product may have. Attributional LCA will not include
such considerations, whereas consequential LCA will.
Such matters can make a difference:
The change in the balance between supply and
demand for a good or service can have far-
reaching impacts. For example, through an attribu-
tional analysis, Searchinger et al. [18] calculated
US corn-based ethanol resulted in a 20% decrease
in greenhouse gas emissions compared to conven-
tional gasoline. However, in a consequential anal-
ysis to account for policy-driven increases in output
of bio-based ethanol, they calculated a 47 % in-
crease in emissions compared to gasoline, due to
assumptions in land use changes induced by pre-
dicted higher prices of corn, soybeans and other
grains from anticipated additional demand for corn
starch for ethanol production [19].8
Some argue that since ‘Most LCA studies are actually
aimed at decision support involving a choice or substi-
tution between two product systems’, it is usually mis-
leading to use an attributional analysis [22].9 Others,
however, emphasize that not only are most LCAs in fact
attributional but also that attributional LCAs are useful
in the context of understanding the workings of the
particular aspects of a product:
In a nutshell, attributional life cycle assessment
focuses on describing the environmentally relevant
impacts of the activities that contribute to a specific
property of a product or process, while consequen-
tial assessment describes how environmentally rel-
evant impacts will, or could, change in response to
the studied action or decision… Neither general
rule sets nor detailed descriptions of specific cases
can prevent deliberate misuse of LCA. LCA is like
a sharp knife. It can be used and abused. A doctor
can certainly do well with a sharp knife, a murderer
presumably not. It makes no sense to blame knifes
or LCAs for misuse [24].
(M [6], 132)The decision of whether to embrace the
greater certainty that goes with an attributional LCA, or
the enhanced ability to answer policy questions that goes
with a consequential LCA, is one value question facing
those commissioning assessments. Making such a deci-
sion for a publicly declared LCA will depend in part on
one’s account of the best way to communicate findings,
which itself may depend on one’s account of the most
pertinent aspects of a possible assessment—and perti-
nence, of course, is not an easy metric to measure. Fur-
thermore, insofar as changes in behaviour are to be in-
cluded in the assessment, one will face questions about
how to value different outcomes. Purely economic or
utilitarian approaches will be theoretically simple; appeals
to other systems, such as a Rawlsian structure or Sen’s
capabilities view, may better stand up to scrutiny [25].
The BISIGODOS LCA included an attributional
analysis using a commercial dataset and supplemented
this with an economic analysis. The issue of how to
determine the functional unit is well-illustrated in the
BISIGODOS assessment. That assessment involved an
analysis of each product separately. One might instead
assess the impact of, for instance, algal oil-based surfac-
tants, given that other products, such as supplemental
foodstuffs or shampoos, are already produced using
algal rather than petrochemical feedstocks. The question
is whether the relevant comparator possible world is one
in which other products except for the one being
assessed are produced using petrochemical, or algal,
means. The answer depends on the policy question at
hand: it may be ‘should we switch production of this one
product towards non-petrochemical feedstocks?’, or it
may be ‘should we engage in a wholesale effort at
switching as many products as possible towards non-
petrochemical feedstocks?’. The LCAmight prima facie
be expected to come out somewhat more in favour of the
algal oil products in the latter kind of assessment, given
production economies of scale. The economic analysis
that was carried out separately inevitably contained
some uncertainty. Nonetheless, given that the technolo-
gy under development would, if successful, be deployed
for numerous products in diverse sectors, it is arguable
8 She continues: “Consequential LCA depends on descriptions of
economic relationships embedded in models. It generally attempts to
reflect complex economic relationships by extrapolating historical
trends in prices, consumption and outputs. This adds to the risk that
inadequate assumptions or other errors significantly affect the final
LCA results.” On the relation between consequential and attributional
LCA, see also Suh and Yang [20] and Plevin et al. [21].
9 For development of such reasoning see Weidema [23].
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that a whole system analysis that incorporated both
economic and environmental considerationswould have
given a more useful (and indeed, positive) result.
Section Summary
We can briefly summarize the points put forward in this
section as follows. In order to make a meaningful assess-
ment, one will need tomake value judgements concerning
(i) what precisely one is to assess; (ii) how to make
comparisons; and (iii) how to respond to uncertainty.10
On the View that Judgements Can Be Made
but Should Not Be Made Public
Given that such judgements must bemade in LCA, what
is the best response?Where should they be located, who
should make them, and how? It would not be sufficient
to assume the attitude of objectivity, since the judge-
ments will be made, whether implicitly or explicitly.
Some take the view that a central pillar of an appropriate
response is that certain of the most controversial judge-
ments should be absent from assessments that are made
public. Such an idea appears in particular with regard to
the issue of weighting. Thus, ISO 14042 states,
‘Weighting shall not be used for comparative assertions
disclosed to the public’. Schmidt and Sullivan provide
some reasoning for such an approach. Their central
claim is that ‘regional variations in legislation, consumer
values, monetary valuation, existing weighting sets and
expert opinions’ imply that ‘no globally agreed upon
weighting set is likely to be derived’. From this they
conclude, ‘For any external communication, none of the
quantitative weighting sets can be used’ [27]11
The reasoning here needs some cashing out. Pizzol
et al. criticize the position of the ISO on the grounds that
it ‘seems to generally disregard the scientific basis of
anything that is not based on natural sciences’ and fur-
thermore hold that it ‘glosses over the fact that LCA, and
environmental modelling in particular, is full of value
choices’ [29]. However, charitably, we might emphasize
that it is a concern about which results are suitable for
public communication that is the concern here, and not
about the fact of value judgements in general.
Still, why does the concern apply only to elements of
LCA that are intended for public communication? The
majority of LCAs is not made public. Why is weighting
by implication acceptable for assessments made for the
purposes of judgements by individual scientists or with-
in research groups or consortia or amongst policy-
makers? Here is one attempt to construct the argument:
1. Insofar as they involve values, international stan-
dards should be based on agreed-upon values.
2. Weighting standards are not agreed upon, and
agreement is unlikely to be attained.
So,
3. The international standards for LCAs should not
involve weighting.
Call this the International Standards argument. In-
deed, ISO standards are worked on by committees of
experts, with the goal of forming agreements. Nonethe-
less, this argument’s second premise claims too much:
as wewill see in subsequent sections, there are ways that
assessors can bring in the views of stakeholders, or
provide multiple outputs, that involve appeals to value
but do not do so in a way that demands their priority in
the context of disagreement. The first premise, further-
more, also claims too much. Whereas the ISO 14042
proposes only avoiding weighting in LCAs aimed at the
public, this argument concludes that even those LCAs
that are to be used internally within an organization
should not use weighting. That view is extreme.
Here is a different argument:
1. Public understanding of technology assessments is
likely to focus upon their headline conclusions.
2. Weighted LCAs will involve headlines that are
likely to be misinterpreted and given an improper
place in public deliberations if their underlying
weighting is not part of their public understanding.
3. General public understanding of weighting is
unlikely.
So,
4. Public understanding of weighted LCAs is likely to
be misinterpreted and given an improper place in
public deliberations.
10 For a similar way of dividing up the field, see Steen [26].
11 This follows the characterization put forward in Hofstetter [28].
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But,
5. Researchers should not make public releases of
technology assessments that are expected to be
misinterpreted and given an improper place in pub-
lic deliberations.
Therefore,
6. Researchers should not make public releases of
weighted LCAs.
Call this the public understanding argument. This
argument does reach the conclusion aimed at by Schmidt
and Sullivan and by the quoted line above from ISO
14042, namely, that weighted LCAs are not suitable for
public consumption. It focuses on the challenges raised
by burying normative assumptions in weighting calcula-
tions. However, many will doubt that premise (3) can be
brought to work in the way that the argument seeks. It
may be the case that with the requisite degree of care
about presentation, the controversies that underly an as-
sessment can be made sufficiently clear to the public.12
Furthermore, the argument does not capture the reason-
ing at hand. It focuses only on the way that public
assessments will flow into public understanding. In
Schmidt et al., there is a move from disagreement, not
misunderstanding, to privacy of reasoning. Even were
there widespread agreement about the appropriate
weighting methods, the above argument would still tell
against public releases of weighted LCAs.
The concern may, instead, be this:
– Weighted LCAs function to conceal in technical
detail matters that should be aired in the sphere of
debates about norms and at the same time infect the
technical matter of carrying out an LCA with con-
troversies about norms that are inappropriate to a
scientific endeavour.
Call this the scientific integrity argument. In order to
consider this, let us broaden the scope of our discussion
beyond weighting and consider the workings of the
LCA as a scientific endeavour more broadly.
If ‘values’ are a part of LCAs, it might be the case
that some types of values are legitimate parts of it, and
some are not. Hertwich et al. forcefully argue against the
ISO approach that divides the relevant value judgements
into ‘value judgements’ proper and ‘technical assump-
tions’, permitting the latter and not the former [12]. For
instance, a particular social discount rate might be seen
as a technical assumption, perhaps on the grounds that it
is numerical, easily substitutable in the analysis, and
forms the basis of a technical comparison. However,
those points do not diminish the status of a social dis-
count rate as a value judgement within an analysis,
requiring for its validity a defence that rests outside of
the analysis and instead in ethics or political theory.
Instead, Hertwich et al. distinguish between ‘constitu-
tive’, ‘contextual’ and ‘preference’ values13, holding that
while the first two may (or indeed must) exist within
legitimately scientific practice, LCA, as a policy guidance
tool, goes beyond science and may also include that third
category of values. Constitutive values involve ‘the accep-
tance of a scientific theory or paradigm’ in the first place.
Contextual values involve ‘personal, social, cultural, or
philosophical emphasis’. Finally, preference values are:
the values that reflect what we care about. Prefer-
ence values reflect not only the utility of various
environmental goods, but also moral values, such
as the concern for equity or for future generations,
or esthetic values, such as the appreciation for
certain landscapes, plants, or animals ([12], p. 21).
On this view, in pure science, one can appeal to values
about matters relating to what counts as a good piece of
science, or how to present uncertainty about outcomes.
But one cannot appeal to values relating to ‘preference’,
that is, about what we aim at and about what fundamen-
tally matters. LCA, on the other hand, ‘requires both
science and preference values because it not only de-
scribes, but also evaluates aspects of reality’ ([12], p.
22). As a practice that assesses what would be a better
outcome, and makes assumptions about how
‘betterness’ is to be understood, LCA inevitably grows
beyond the scientific method that it rests upon.
In embracing the idea that LCA goes beyond science,
this account is on the right track. There is a point of
12 There are different weighting systems that one may employ. Could
there be a meta-weighting: an assessment that contains several of these
systems? Such an unreflective approach renders the assessment sus-
ceptible to the number of different weighting methods in each area,
rather than the reasons that are at stake. Schmidt, Sullivan, and
Hofstetter are all in agreement on that point. 13 The distinction builds on that made in Shrader-Frechette [30].
278 Nanoethics (2020) 14:271–283
caution to be made about the language used in putting
the point. The idea that ‘preferences’ are what mark
values as of the type that are beyond science and
perhaps to be fed into a technology assessment en-
courages the idea that such values as equity and
utility and justice have similar properties as aesthetic
values—a point of contention in philosophy. Indeed,
Hertwich et al. appear to follow through on this view
of value claims: Whereas the approach suggested
here can turn LCA method development and appli-
cation into objective exercises, its reliance on prefer-
ences and the conditions of environmental decision
making preclude the existence of uniquely correct
methods and results. Competing claims of the envi-
ronmental superiority of alternative products are
therefore permissible ([12], p. 26).
However, there may be right answers to currently
controversial normative questions. Perhaps these are
very difficult answers to know. In this case, competing
claims about the superiority of different products can be
permissible, and this situation arises not because of
preferences that lack any possible resolution in principle
but because the objective truth of the matter about the
values at stake is contested and hard to discover. We
might thereby retain the ‘multiple outputs’ approach
without committing to the relativism suggested by some
of this language. TheHertwich et al. argument is thereby
more broadly applicable.
The language of the ISO 14044 standard itself, in-
deed, encourages this narrowing:
Different individuals, organizations and societies
may have different preferences; therefore it is
possible that different parties will reach different
weighting results based on the same indicator
results or normalised indicator results.14
Again, we would caution against the relativistic use of the
term ‘preferences’ to incorporate both conceptions of
fairness and justice and also expressions of mere liking.
Multiple Outputs and Stakeholders
The challenge remains: how to use LCA, given its entan-
glement with what matters, in a way that is legitimate,
given widespread uncertainty and disagreement about
what matters. There is an emerging mainstream answer
to that question, urging that we embrace the possibility of
multiple outputs, consult stakeholders and carry out as-
sessments in an anticipatory way. In this section we lay
out these ideas. In the following section, we set out some
doubts and sketch another (complementary) response.
The multiple output approach urges that several as-
sessments should be run in parallel, each reflecting
different value sets. In this spirit, Hofstetter et al. put
forward:
three structurally identical types of LCA, each
based on one coherent but different set of values.
These sets of values can be derived from the
Cultural Theory and are labeled as ‘egalitarian’,
‘individualistic’, and ‘hierarchic’.
Two further sets of values, labelled ‘fatalist’ and ‘her-
mits’, are deemed to be opposed to or uninterested in
LCA altogether. The approach does provide a frame-
work for providing multiple outputs from a single set of
inputs in an assessment [31]. And it may be of use in
developing products for market, where there is a de-
mand for the ability to recognize what will be of interest
to different sections of a population.
However, this way of running an analysis faces the
difficultly that it is insufficiently clear that the five
sets of value are meaningfully distinct and useful
categories. Can one hold a mixture of several? If it
is common to do so, then there ought to be far more
than three analyses. If it is uncommon or impossible
to combine the value sets proposed, then one would
expect there to be a strong empirical base for their
existence—and it is far from clear that this basis
exists, notwithstanding the appeal to cultural theory.
In addressing that point, Steen distinguishes between
two broad value sets, ‘weak sustainability’ and
‘strong sustainability’, and shows how an LCA might
proceed on the terms of each [26]. This has the
advantage of mapping values on to a more readily
recognizable set of possible purposes of an LCA and
tapping directly into its technical functioning. None-
theless, some will take the view that there remains a
danger that supposed disagreements about value sets
will be artificially imposed upon the data. Further,
creating complicated assessments with multiple out-
puts may increase accuracy at the cost of clarity:
complex outcomes of assessments with multiple pos-
sible outputs are difficult to parse.14 ISO 14044 2006: s.4.4.3.4.2
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Both considerations speak in favour of including
stakeholders in the process. Wender et al. argue:
As opposed to a practitioner making these [value]
decisions in isolation, environmental LCA should
employ social science engagement methods to
identify impacted stakeholders, elicit their value
preferences, and use these numerous – often con-
flicting – perspectives to inform modeling
decisions.15
By using disagreements about values derived from
stakeholders, the multiple outputs will be more organic.
Further, the output can be expected to be more compre-
hensible, since the root of any disagreement can be
traced to its source in the views of stakeholders. Accep-
tance of complicated outputs from assessments, then,
speaks in favour of stakeholder consultation.
In this spirit, some propose modifications of LCA
that incorporate responsible research and innovation
processes. For example, ‘social LCA’ includes reference
to stakeholders in the following terms:
In the UNEP-SETAC S-LCA ‘the impact catego-
ries should reflect internationally recognized
categorizations/standards ... and/or result from a
multi-stakeholder process’. ([32], pp. 55)
It may be noted that this approach still does notmandate
a structured stakeholder consultation. Other sophisticat-
ed processes are being proposed. Matthews et al. lay out
what they label ‘constructive sustainability assessment’,
which locates LCA within a full framework of respon-
sible research and innovation:
…the power of analytical approaches like LCA is
maximised when they are grounded within a
broader, more deliberative framework.
We have also explored more participatory and
deliberative frameworks such as RRI which offer
an alternative, more qualitative and reflective per-
spective…We argue that combining these frame-
works, with a dedicated period of evidence and
data collection using tools like LCA, can offer
enhancements. ([33], p. 69)
It should also be noted that alongside proposals for
stakeholder representation and involvement, there is an
accompanying call for anticipatory LCA, whereby as-
sessments are carried out early on in research, perhaps
with a higher degree of speculation, and are then repeat-
ed later on [3]. Such a practice further permits the
categories of assessment to develop in accordance with
ongoing assessments and is in accordance with the way
that early consideration of impacts and consultation
about them provides a way for hidden policy issues to
be identified [34].
Doubts and a Proposal
There are limitations to blanket advocacy of multiple
output, stakeholder-consulted LCAs. The involvement
of stakeholders is not free or even cheap and includes
bureaucratic and time costs. Some research can be ex-
pected to yield little of concern for non-research stake-
holders or little that is new. There is, in principle, a
danger that earlier, more conceptual research may be
inhibited by a call to involve stakeholders, where prac-
tical issues are unlikely to be uncovered.
Furthermore, it is not obvious a priori that assess-
ments of technology should map on to research projects.
That is to say, we should consider the science system as
a whole, rather than each project one by one. There is
potential for inefficient overlaps of consultation, wheth-
er simultaneously or over time. For example, regarding
the BISIGODOS LCA, there were other similar LCAs
on other projects investigating the derivation of com-
mercial products for algal oils, the project was explor-
atory, and other LCAs would be involved in related
projects in the future. In this sense, non-anticipatory
LCAs can be anticipatory of future research projects
and thereby meet the concerns of those advocating the
need to carry out technology assessments at a relatively
early stage of development. Similarly, so long as stake-
holders are consulted about a technology type sufficient-
ly, it is unclear that the marginal benefits of consultation
on each project will outweigh the marginal costs.
In general, LCA is a tool, and can legitimately be
used for different purposes, not all of them consulta-
tive. Stakeholder engagement is neither sufficient for
appropriately dealing with the inevitable involvement
of what matters in designing LCA nor is it at every
point necessary.
15 They also note: “While stakeholder engagement is discussed in ISO
standards for environmental LCA, practitioners typically do not have
the requisite training to identify affected parties and elicit the relevant
value preferences.” ([3], p. 202).
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The increasing appeal to RRI raises an independent
concern, which is that the framework has not yet extended
to direct attention towards large catastrophes. People com-
monly display serious quirks of judgment when making
assessments of risks that have either very high impacts or
very low probabilities, and accordingly judgments of high
impact, low probability risks are especially poor [35]. For
instance, insofar as our tendency to assess probability is
based in previous experience, there is a framing effect,
whereby we will tend irrationally to discount the chances
of unfamiliar scenarios in which we do not exist. Such a
tendency can affect the integrity of consultations of stake-
holders, unless it is directly addressed. Although in the last
decade there has been an increasingly sophisticated litera-
ture on the subject,16 catastrophic risks have not yet entered
the lexicon of RRI, and there is a danger that by taking on
the emphasis on stakeholder consultation that exists within
RRI, LCA could further compound this gap. This effect
could be aggravated by the leanings of LCA towards
inputs that can be stated with greater certainty. For exam-
ple, it has been noted that in the field of nanoparticles, it is
common for LCAs to run from cradle to gate (i.e., before
transportation to the consumer), instead of cradle to grave
(which would include the effects of distribution, consump-
tion and disposal). Even though the methodology would
strictly require the latter, researchers are also inhibited by a
lack of data ([37], p. 71). That inhibition will not prime
assessors well for consideration of one-off, large-scale
catastrophes, which are especially difficult to fit within—
for example—an expected utility function.
We have looked at two types of response to the exis-
tence of value judgements within LCAs: building in mul-
tiple outputs and incorporating stakeholder consultations.
Not only are they strong complements, they have a con-
ceptual feature in common. This is that they identify ways
to outsource the value judgements involved in LCAs into
external processes. The multiple values approach seeks to
state different outputs based upon different possible assess-
ment patterns and to allow those consuming the assess-
ment to decide which to apply. The stakeholder consulta-
tion approach seeks to place consideration of normative
issues in the hands of those being consulted.
We conclude by urging the inevitability of a third,
complementary approach, which we might call ‘re-
searcher awareness’. This holds that those commission-
ing and carrying out the assessments will themselves
bring judgements of the type that we have described into
the process, and that rather than merely delegating such
judgements to others, we can improve assessments by
recognizing the existence and influence of such judge-
ments, and further, that recognizing them explicitly is a
way to improve them. Happily, it is increasingly com-
mon for researchers, too, to be versed in questions, such
as what kinds of impact are socially relevant for making
an assessment? What should we expect of people’s own
behaviour change? How are different kinds of impact to
be weighed against one another? How is risk and un-
certainty to be treated, and how far should distant future
costs be discounted? How far can we countenance pos-
sibilities in which production in other industries chang-
es? In such a light, it would be hubristic to ask that a
systematic assessment could provide an objective com-
parison of the impact of one product and another. An
example of this in action is the use of different forms of
multi-criteria decision analysis as a way to aid overall
technology assessments that incorporate sustainability,
toxicity and economic concerns ([37], p. 71). This is not
to say that all scientists must at all times always be
policy or ethics experts, or that value judgements should
never be outsourced. The point, rather, is that it is better
for practitioners to embrace rather than deny the entan-
glement of ethical and political elements within LCAs;
to be aware of the multiple ways that they arise, as we
have described; and to be prepared to confront them
early on in the research process. It is becoming more
common for LCAs to be used as evidence by decision
makers, and so in order to maximize their potential and
to ensure they are fit for purpose, it is critical that as
much information as possible has been considered by
the practitioner from the outset and is included in the full
assessment of any given scenario―including informa-
tion about the value-laden nature of the assessment.
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